Ideology can be understood as a type of cultural system, a set of interrelated meanings that are symbolically mediated through semiotic devices such as metaphors. Ideologies underlie social orders as well as help people make sense of their environment and decide on courses of action. While much has been said about ideology, little has been written on the sources of ideological change beyond pointing to ideological entrepreneurship. Even less has been written on the relationship between violent and disruptive social movements (...) and ideology beyond pointing to the ideological motivations for the movements. We contend that extreme protests are often triggered by an ideological crisis, that is, an intolerable disconnection between the ideology adopted by some group and the current circumstances or, alternatively, an inability of their ideology to make sense of their current situation. Moreover, extreme protests are a form of ideological work, as they are often sources of ideological inspiration, development, and change. (shrink)

Regulators of G protein signaling (RGS) proteins provide timely termination of G protein‐coupled receptor (GPCR) responses. Serving as a central control point in GPCR signaling cascades, RGS proteins are promising targets for drug development. In this review, we discuss the involvement of RGS proteins in the pathophysiology of the gastrointestinal inflammation and their potential to become a target for anti‐inflammatory drugs. Specifically, we evaluate the emerging evidence for modulation of selected receptor families: opioid, cannabinoid and serotonin by RGS proteins. We (...) discuss how the regulation of RGS protein level and activity may modulate immunological pathways involved in the development of intestinal inflammation. Finally, we propose that RGS proteins may serve as a prognostic factor for survival rate in colorectal cancer. The ideas introduced in this review set a novel conceptual framework for the utilization of RGS proteins in the treatment of gastrointestinal inflammation, a growing major concern worldwide. (shrink)

Each of the five volumes in the Stone Art Theory Institutes series—and the seminars on which they are based—brings together a range of scholars who are not always directly familiar with one another’s work. The outcome of each of these convergences is an extensive and “unpredictable conversation” on knotty and provocative issues about art. This fourth volume in the series, _Beyond the Aesthetic and the Anti-Aesthetic_, focuses on questions revolving around the concepts of the aesthetic, the anti-aesthetic, and the political. (...) The book is about the fact that now, almost thirty years after Hal Foster defined the anti-aesthetic, there is still no viable alternative to the dichotomy between aesthetics and anti- or non-aesthetic art. The impasse is made more difficult by the proliferation of identity politics, and it is made less negotiable by the hegemony of anti-aesthetics in academic discourse on art. The central question of this book is whether artists and academicians are free of this choice in practice, in pedagogy, and in theory. The contributors are Stéphanie Benzaquen, J. M. Bern­stein, Karen Busk-Jepsen, Luis Camnitzer, Diarmuid Costello, Joana Cunha Leal, Angela Dimitrakaki, Alexander Dumbadze, T. Brandon Evans, Geng Youzhuang, Boris Groys, Beáta Hock, Gordon Hughes, Michael Kelly, Grant Kester, Meredith Kooi, Cary Levine, Sunil Manghani, William Mazzarella, Justin McKeown, Andrew McNamara, Eve Meltzer, Nadja Millner-Larsen, Maria Filomena Molder, Carrie Noland, Gary Peters, Aaron Richmond, Lauren Ross, Toni Ross, Eva Schürmann, Gregory Sholette, Noah Simblist, Jon Simons, Robert Storr, Martin Sundberg, Timotheus Vermeulen, and Rebecca Zorach. (shrink)

Surveying job segmentation within nursing, this article analyzes attempts by professional registered nurses and nursing educators to resist the deskilling of nursing. In so doing, they have reinforced race and class segmentation within nursing. The article concludes with a discussion of class, race, and gender stratification and suggests that resistance to deskilling may reinforce inequalities among women.

Three years ago Robert Saltonstall, Jr., Associate Vice President for Operations at Harvard University, faced an increasingly common problem in business and institutions today when he severed 68 long-service, wage employees to solve a problem of low productivity in a particular trade group. He did this using relatively conventional and creative techniques. But now three years later, he asked Nona Lyons of the Harvard Graduate School of Education, who is researching the ethical dimensions of executives' decisions, to assist him (...) in evaluating how these employees felt about the process. The employees' loyalty in spite of everything has caused Saltonstall to rethink the ethics of both his decision and its execution. In this article Saltonstall asks and answers many of the questions executives face when challenged to handle work reduction decisions in a more ethical way. And Lyons assists him with commentary on some of the current research on moral decision-making which will help executives to understand why they find some of their decisions to be moral dilemmas. The article challenges executives to think about reorganization decisions in a participative way and suggests seven central issues executives should consider before commencing a participative approach. The article reaches no specific conclusion, but introduces some new ways to think about lay-off decisions and their ethical implications for those affected. (shrink)

This is the collection of essays presented to Bochenski on his 60th birthday, and it contains, as a mirror of Bochenski's own work, a broad spectrum of studies ranging from formal logic and history of logic, to the philosophy of logic and language, and to the methodology of explanation in Greek philosophy. Of the seventeen articles, these are some of the more important to the reviewer: "Betrachtungen zum Sequenzen Kalkül" by Paul Bernays, which is an extensive study of Gentzen-type formulations (...) of logic; "Remarks on Formal Deduction," H. B. Curry, a further discussion of sequenzen-logics; "Marginalia on Gentzen's Sequenzen Kalkül" by Hughes Leblanc; "Method and Logic in Presocratic Explanation," Jerry Stannard; "On the Logic of Preference and Choice," H. S. Houthakker, a suggestive presentation of decision and utility theory in logical form; "Leibniz's Law in Belief Contexts," Chisholm; "On Ontology and the Province of Logic," R. M. Martin; and "N. A. Vasilev and the Development of Many-valued Logics," G. L. Kline, an important addition to the history of logic. Other contributors are: Storrs McCall, Albert Menne, E. W. Beth, Benson Mates, Ivo Thomas, J. F. Staal, F. R. Barbò, A.-T. Tymieniecka, and N. M. Luyten. There is a bibliography of Bochenski's writings through 1962.—P. J. M. (shrink)

The high-tech health service work done by amateur family caregivers in U.S. homes challenges the conventional division of the social world into public and private. Under new federal reimbursement systems, the diagnosis-related groups, patients are being discharged sicker than before from hospitals and nursing homes, or after treatments in outpatient clinics. Health care facilities depend on a work transfer, shifting their earlier responsibilities for the sick to the family. There, women family members do for free the work once done by (...) paid health service workers in health care facilities, caring for family members who need their nursing and housekeeping services. Women's unpaid work knits together “public” and “private,” demonstrating how capitalism reorganizes the labor process to make use of free service labor. (shrink)

Storrs McCall presents an original philosophical theory of the nature of the universe based on a striking new model of its space- time structure. He shows how his model illuminates a broad range of subjects, including causation, probability, quantum mechanics, identity, and free will, and argues that the fact that the model throws light on such a large number of problems constitutes strong evidence that the universe is as the model portrays it.

A theory of temporal passage is put forward which is "objective" in the sense that time flow characterizes the universe independently of the existence of conscious beings. The theory differs from Grunbaum's "mind-dependence" theory, and is designed to avoid Grunbaum's criticisms of an earlier theory of Reichenbach's. The representation of temporal becoming is accomplished by the introduction of indeterministic universe-models; each model representing the universe at a time. The models depict the past as a single four-dimensional manifold, and the future (...) as a branched structure of such manifolds. Time flow is relativistic in that it manifests itself in a frame-dependent (but not observer-dependent) way. The indeterministic character of the universe-models is mirrored in a "temporal" theory of truth which rejects the principle of bivalence, and suitable semantics are provided for this theory. Finally, an account of physical law is given which defines it in terms of physical possibility, rather than vice versa. (shrink)

The thesis of 3D/4D equivalence states that every three-dimensional description of the world is translatable without remainder into a four-dimensional description, and vice versa. In representing an object in 3D or in 4D terms we are giving alternative descriptions of one and the same thing, and debates over whether the ontology of the physical world is "really" 3D or 4D are pointless. The twins paradox is shown to rest, in relativistic 4D geometry, on a reversed law of triangle inequality. But (...) considering the twins as 3D beings who age through time, the paradox implies that time passes at different rates in different reference frames, and therefore that the concept of a single global or Absolute time is unsustainable. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...) made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

David Lewis, following in the tradition of Broad, Quine and Goodman, says that change in an object X consists in X's being temporally extended and having qualitatively different temporal parts. Analogously, change in a spatially extended object such as a road consists in its having different spatial parts . The alternative to this view is that ordinary objects undergo temporal change in virtue of having different intrinsic non-relational properties at different times. They endure, remaining the same object throughout change, whereas (...) Lewis's temporally extended 4D objects perdure.It is impossible to come down on one side or the other of the endurance/perdurance debate without a clear and unambiguous understanding of what ‘endurance’ is. ‘Perdurance’ is clear enough. Every 4D object of non-zero temporal thickness perdures simply by having temporal extension, i.e. by having different temporal parts, or stages, at different times. But Lewis muddies the waters by giving a confused and ultimately untenable definition of endurance.His first step is to cover both perduring and enduring by offering the neutral word persist. ‘Let us say that something persists iff, somehow or other, it exists at various times’ . Something then perdures if it persists by having different temporal parts at different times, no one part being wholly present at more than one time. In contrast, a thing endures if it persists by being wholly present at more than one …. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to prove the consistency of libertarianism. We examine the example of Jane, who deliberates at length over whether to vacation in Colorado (C) or Hawaii (H), weighing the costs and benefits, consulting travel brochures, etc. Underlying phenomenological deliberation is an indeterministic neural process in which nonactual motor neural states n(C) and n(H) corresponding to alternatives C and H remain physically possible up until the moment of decision. The neurophysiological probabilities pr(n(C)) and pr(n(H)) evolve continuously (...) according to the different weights Jane's judgement attaches to C and H at different times during the deliberation. The overall process is indeterministic, since Jane's exact judgemental weighting would vary slightly were the process to be repeated from the same initial conditions. The weighting is however rational, and entirely under Jane's control. This controlled, rational, indeterministic process shows that libertarianism is a consistent philosophical thesis. (shrink)

We all make decisions, sometimes dozens in the course of a day. This paper is about what is involved in this activity. It's my contention that the ability to deliberate, to weigh different courses of action, and then to decide on one of them, is a distinctively human activity, or at least an activity which sets man and the higher animals apart from other creatures. It is as much decisio as ratio that constitutes the distinguishing mark of human beings. Homo (...) may not always be rationalis, but he is always decidens.The paper is about practical decision, although there is also another important kind of decision that I won't discuss, namely cognitive decision. The difference is roughly that which distinguishes the function of a jury from that of a judge, at least in jury trials. The jury's job is to arrive at an answer to the question: guilty or not guilty? This is a cognitive decision, a decision that, on the basis of the evidence, such-and-such is the case. The judge, apprized of the jury's cognitive decision, makes the practical decision to sentence the guilty party to 20 years. On some other occasion, I hope to be able to say something about cognitive decision, as well as about a third kind of decision named value decision. (shrink)

Propositional temporalism is the view that there are temporary propositions: propositions that are true, but not always true. Factual futurism is the view that there are futurist facts: facts that obtain, but that will at some point not obtain. Most A-theoretic views in the philosophy of time are committed both to propositional temporalism and to factual futurism. Mark Richard, Jeffrey King and others have argued that temporary propositions are not fit to be the contents of propositional attitudes, or to be (...) the semantic values of natural language utterances. But these discussions have overlooked another role that the A-theorist’s posits struggle to play: the role of facts in explaining other facts. Focusing on the case of action explanation by reasons, this paper presents the challenge that explanation poses for factual futurism. It then brings that challenge to bear against propositional temporalism and the A-theory more generally. My argument saddles the factual futurist with surprising commitments concerning reasons, facts and explanation. The futurist might accept those commitments and pay the price. The alternative – which I prefer – is to reject factual futurism, and with it the A-theory. (shrink)

The relation between Hume’s constructive and skeptical aims has been a central concern for Hume interpreters. Hume’s two definitions of ‘cause’ in the Treatise and first Enquiry apparently represent an important constructive achievement, but this paper argues that the definitions must be understood in terms of Hume’s skepticism. The puzzle I address is simply that Hume gives two definitions rather than one. I use Don Garrett’s interpretation as a foil to develop my alternative skeptical interpretation. Garrett claims the definitions exhibit (...) a general susceptibility to two kinds of definition that all “sense-based concepts” share. Against Garrett, I argue that the definitions express an imperfection Hume finds only in our concept of causation. That imperfection is absent from other sense-based concepts, and prompts skeptical sentiments in Hume’s conclusion to the Treatise’s Book 1. I close by comparing my interpretation with those of Helen Beebee, Stephen Buckle, Galen Strawson and Paul Russell. (shrink)

Anthony Storr offers a lucid and objective look at Freud's major theories, evaluating whether they have stood the test of time, and in the process examines Freud himself in light of his own ideas. 'a model exercise in synthesis, and the final essay on the 'appeal' of psychotherapy is especially neat.' -Independent.

Although Schütz’s relationship with the Austrian school of economics was an intimate one, Lavoie and other Austrian scholars have challenged (a) Schütz’s characterization of praxeology as an objective science of subjective phenomena and (b) the ability of Schütz’s phenomenology, which emphasizes the subjective meanings of actors, to really make sense of spontaneous social orders. It is my contention, however, that Schütz can be adequately defended against both these charges. First, for Schütz, the claim that social science is an objective science (...) of subjective phenomena need not imply apodictic apriorism nor solipsism. Second, in spite of his emphasis on subjective meanings, the study of spontaneous social orders need not be difficult to justify. (shrink)

Relative to any point in time, how many possible futures are there? For example, it may rain tomorrow, or again it may not. So it would appear that relative to today, there are at least two possible futures, one involving rain tomorrow and the other not. Of course only one of these two future states of affairs will take place, and in that sense there is only one actual future, though there may be many possible futures. The only hypothesis under (...) which there is, for every instant in time, only one possible future, is the hypothesis of universal Laplacean determinism, and this hypothesis has had little to recommend it since the advent of quantum physics. Furthermore, although among the many possible futures relative to any given moment in time there is only one which will become actual, no distinguishing mark separates this one from its fellows at the given moment. So it would appear that what confronts the world at each moment in time is an undifferentiated multiplicity of possible futures. But this multiplicity, though at first sight admittedly frightening in its implications, may be put to good philosophical use: as will be seen it yields natural and convincing definitions of the notions of physical necessity and possibility. On the other hand, alternative definitions of these notions are obtainable which do not make use of the manifold of possible futures, and these also will be presented. The paper will be in two parts, the first dealing with the concepts of physical possibility and necessity, and the second presenting a formal calculus of necessary and sufficient conditions in which the physical modalities find their place. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In their contribution to the first part of this special issue Craig Bourn and Emily Caddick Bourne claim to have solved a puzzle I put forward in my ‘An Insoluble Problem’. Here I argue that their attempt fails.

Combining quantum mechanics with special relativity requires (i) that a spacetime representation of quantum states be found; (ii) that such states, represented as extended along equal-time hyperplanes, be invariant when transformed from one frame to another; and (iii) that collapses of states be instantaneous in every frame. These requirements are met using branching spacetime, in which probabilities of outcomes are represented by the numerical proportions of branches on which the outcomes occur. Quantum states of systems are then identified with the (...) probability values, built into spacetime along spacelike hypersurfaces, of all possible outcomes of all possible tests to which the systems can be subjected. (shrink)

Examines the theories of Plato, Rousseau, Mary Wollstonecraft, Catherine Beecher, and Charlotte Perkins Gilman concerning the education of women.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Spiritual Experience and Psychopathology”Anthony Storr (bio)Many psychiatrists, including myself, are deeply dissatisfied with current psychiatric taxonomy. Grossly abnormal people like multiple murderers are often deemed sane in law, because they do not happen to exhibit the symptoms of recognized mental illnesses like schizophrenia or manic-depressive psychosis. In contrast, some of those who do exhibit such symptoms, and who therefore risk being labeled psychotic, cannot be considered (...) to be “ill,” and are in fact mentally robust. There is considerable overlap between experiences which psychiatrists call psychotic, and experiences which are generally called spiritual by those who have them.In order to illustrate this overlap, the authors quote three cases of people describing a variety of delusions and hallucinations which would certainly prompt the diagnosis of psychosis—usually some variety of schizophrenia—were it not for the fact that all three claimed that their experiences had been of considerable benefit to them.It is noteworthy that, in each case, the psychotic/spiritual experiences followed a period of stress. The first subject was threatened by legal action; the second had surmounted an episode of depression, but was questioning whether she could continue her career in business; the third was unemployed, in debt, and suspected that he had multiple sclerosis. The first subject developed both grandiose and religious delusions; but the revelations which he claimed were a sign of God’s special grace toward him enabled him to win his law case and set up a charitable institution. The second heard the voice of Jesus summoning her to work for him. She became convinced that she was specially gifted in various parapsychological fields, and became a religious counselor. As the authors point out, “Her experiences, if delusional and hallucinatory, were overwhelmingly positive in their content and fruits.” The third subject also experienced hallucinatory voices which were intensely reassuring, gave him new insight into the nature of reality, and guided his further progress. As a result, he believed that he had such support that “nothing in this world can worry me.” In each case, the psychotic experience proved to be a solution to the subject’s problem, rather than a breakdown ending in admission to a mental hospital. This raises a variety of intellectual problems.The authors suggest that psychotic phenomena may be good or bad, and label the good phenomena “spiritual” and the bad phenomena “pathological.” According to this point of view, psychotic experience need not be considered pathological, especially if consideration is given to the structure of values and beliefs professed by the individual concerned. [End Page 83]I am not happy with this distinction. I entirely agree that psychotic experience may be a solution to a subject’s problems; but whether it is considered spiritual or pathological depends partly upon the nature of the experience, and even more upon the social setting in which it occurs. A grandiose delusion that one is especially selected and addressed by God may cure the depression of someone who has so far considered himself a nonentity if it is accepted by others. In my study of gurus, Feet of Clay (1996), I make the point that a guru seeks disciples because they reinforce his delusions and may, in some instances, keep him out of hospital. Of the three cases described in this paper, the first told “various friends and ministers about them.” The second confided in her priest and was told that her experiences were authentic within their shared Christian belief system. The third did not apparently share his hallucinatory experience with friends; but, when he responded to the invitation to write to the Alister Hardy Research Centre, wrote, “It is fascinating to find I’m not on my own in this. I have naturally queried my own sanity, and generally don’t discuss it....”Medical diagnosis and psychiatric diagnosis are not strictly comparable. If I as a doctor find that X is suffering from diabetes, I can treat X as an isolated entity displaying symptoms and signs of a well-known disease. I cannot do this when X is displaying “psychotic” symptoms; for whether or not those symptoms are regarded as pathological depends upon the social setting in which they... (shrink)

This volume contains six new and fifteen previously published essays -- plus a new introduction -- by Storrs McCall. Some of the essays were written in collaboration with E. J. Lowe of Durham University. The essays discuss controversial topics in logic, action theory, determinism and indeterminism, and the nature of human choice and decision. Some construct a modern up-to-date version of Aristotle's bouleusis, practical deliberation. This process of practical deliberation is shown to be indeterministic but highly controlled and the antithesis (...) of chance. Others deal with the concept of branching four-dimensional space-time, explain non-local influences in quantum mechanics, or reconcile God's omniscience with human free will. The eponymous first essay contains the proof of a fact that in 1931 Kurt Gödel had claimed to be unprovable, namely that the set of arithmetic truths forms a consistent system. (shrink)

In his paper ‘‘Bad luck once again’’ Neil Levy attacks our proof of the consistency of libertarianism by reiterating a time-worn compatibilist complaint.1 This is, that what is not determined must be due to chance. If A has a choice of X or Y, neither X nor Y being causally determined, then if A chooses X it can only be by chance, never for a reason. The only ‘‘reason’’ that could explain the choice of X over Y would have to (...) be a causally sufficient reason, which would rule out A’s having a genuine choice in the first place. Either X is causally necessitated or X is realized by sheer luck. But that these are the only alternatives is untrue. The exercise of deliberative reason opens the way between the Scylla of causal necessitation and the Charybdis of chance, as we shall try to make clear. The central core of Levy’s argument is that any attempt to give a reasons-based explanation of a contrastive fact must fail. A contrastive fact is a fact of the kind ‘‘Jane decides to vacation in Hawaii rather than Colorado,’’ or ‘‘Jane assigns a greater weight to surfing that to white-water rafting.’’ In the last three paragraphs of his paper Levy argues that Jane’s assigning more weight to surfing than to rafting cannot be a reasons-based assignment, because, as he puts it, ‘‘the reasons that would explain the weighting are the weighted reasons themselves.’’ Similarly, prior to making her Hawaii⁄ Colorado decision, Jane has.. (shrink)